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FmHA's Efforts Against Delinquent
Borrowers: Property Interests and
Transaction Costs
Terence J. Centner and Fred C. White
A recent judicial  decision has precluded  the Farmers  Home Administration  from
employing  nonjudicial foreclosure  proceedings  in some states. Characteristics  of
FmHA loans and borrowers suggest  that a potential "hold-up"  problem exists
whereby borrowers  may cause the value of their mortgaged properties to diminish
below the outstanding balance  of the loan. Empirical  results of a survey show that the
preclusion of nonjudicial foreclosure increased FmHA's  direct losses from delinquent
borrowers.
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The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA),
an important lender in the agricultural  sector,
has  recently  been confronted  with an inordi-
nate number of delinquent borrowers (table 1).
Poor  performance  in the  agricultural  sector,
declining farm real estate prices, and potential
deterioration of  rural residential and other farm
structures have contributed to the delinquency
problem and have led FmHA to initiate fore-
closure  and  voluntary  conveyance  actions  in
order to protect its  security interests  in mort-
gaged properties.  In  1984,  FmHA's ability to
use  the  remedy  of  nonjudicial  foreclosure
against delinquent borrowers was limited by a
federal court decision.  Data concerning delin-
quent FmHA rural housing borrowers suggest
that the "power of  sale" clause in FmHA's loan
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I Johnson v.  United States Department ofAgriculture, 734 F.2d
774-89  (llth  Cir.  1984).  This  case  is  not to  be  confused  with
Coleman v. Block,  562  F. Supp.  1353-68  (N.D.  1983),  a decision
from  North Dakota  which enjoined FmHA  from  taking adverse
action  without  proper  notice  and  hearing  requirements  against
persons holding FmHA farm  program  loans. Although  Coleman
v. Block  did not involve nonjudicial  foreclosure,  the  court's  re-
sponse of  delaying FmHA action against delinquent borrowers may
have resulted in additional transaction costs similar to those dis-
cussed in this paper.
agreements  constitutes  a crucial element of a
minimum-cost,  quality-policing arrangement.
Nonjudicial  foreclosure  is an essential con-
tract  remedy  because  transaction  costs  at
contract  formation  and  breach  can  create  a
"hold-up"  problem wherein the foreclosure  of
FmHA-financed  real  estate  occurs  after  the
value of the property drops below outstanding
debt.  Wealth-maximizing  borrowers  are able
to deviate from, or renege on, the terms of  their
FmHA  loan  agreements  to  the detriment  of
FmHA. FmHA needs the abbreviated process
of nonjudicial foreclosure to minimize the en-
suing waste of public resources.
Transaction  costs  arise  at  contract  forma-
tion and  when  there  is  a breach  of contract
because of uncertainty of responses and level
of performance.  The major transaction cost at
formation of the agreement is the uncertainty
of  borrower performance. Because FmHA loan
programs  are  generally  for high-risk  borrow-
ers,  FmHA's  transaction  costs  at  formation
may be expected  to be greater  than those  in-
curred by private lending institutions.  Trans-
action costs  associated  with a breach  of con-
tract  may  include  a  "capitalized  interest
subsidy"  and disincentives for delinquent bor-
rowers  to  relinquish  their properties.  At  the
same time, uncertainty  may operate as an im-
pediment against claims of  a breach of contract
(Klein).
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Active borrowers  behind sched-
ule  payment  79,534  5,299a
Filed bankruptcy petitions  4,018  N/A
Discontinued farming or loss of
housing due to bankruptcy  811  120
Foreclosure  action pending  980  N/A
Voluntary conveyances  1,090  N/A
Borrowers discontinuing  farm-
ing due to financial  difficulties  4,695  N/A
Supervised bank accounts  38,988  13,889
Loan rescheduling or reamorti-
zation  120,098  6,718
Source:  U.S. Department  of Agriculture,  Farmers Home  Admin-
istration, "Farm  and Housing Activity Report,"  30 Sep.  1985.
Note:  Selected data for fiscal  year ending 30  Sep.  1985.
aData  from  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Farmers  Home
Administration,  "Farm  and  Housing  Activity  Report,"  31  Jan.
1986.
FmHA's  contractual  loan  agreement  does
not  contain  explicit  terms  for  every  contin-
gency  and,  therefore,  is  accompanied  by  at-
tendant costs of negotiation,  supervision,  en-
forcement, and risk (Alston, Datta, and Nugent;
De  Alessi;  Dugger).  The  absence of specified
or  enforceable  contract terms  may cause  or-
dinary market remedies,  such as judicial fore-
closure, to be unsatisfactory.  Incomplete  con-
tracts  may  also  subject  contractees  to
postcontractual opportunistic behavior (Klein,
Crawford,  and  Alchian).  Williamson  delin-
eates the employment of arbitration,  specific-
performance,  or other elaborated  governance
apparatus as neoclassical contract remedies to
provide relief from costs involved with incom-
plete contracts.
This paper analyzes FmHA real estate loans
and judicial  constraint  precluding  the use  of
the contractual remedy of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure.  It commences  with  an  overview  of the
pertinent elements of FmHA's real estate loan
programs  and  a  review  of the  institutional
remedies available  for use against  delinquent
borrowers.  An  economic  analysis  follows,
viewing  borrowers'  statutorily  created  prop-
erty  interest  as  a  normative  property  right
(Dragun). An investigation  of performance  of
contract theory discloses uncertainties  accom-
panying FmHA  loans  which  create  a "hold-
up" problem.
FmHA  Loan Programs and Institutional
Remedies
FmHA has several different  loan programs to
provide credit to various members of the rural
community.  These programs include not only
traditional farm ownership and operating loans
but also soil and water conservation loans, rec-
reation  loans,  rural  housing  loans,  resource
conservation  and  development  loans,  and
emergency loans (U.S. Code, Titles 7 and 42).
This paper  focuses  on FmHA's  farm  own-
ership and rural housing loan programs (U.S.
Statutes).  Persons  borrowing  funds  from
FmHA  pursuant  to the  legislative  and  regu-
latory provisions of both the farm and home
ownership loan programs are required to sign
a promissory note which provides for the bor-
rowers'  repayment of principal and interest in
accordance  with  schedules  and  repayment
plans prescribed by the secretary of  agriculture.
FmHA farm ownership borrowers may qualify
for low  interest  rate  loans,  while  individual
home ownership loans have adjustable interest
rates determined by a formula which takes into
account the homeowners'  income (C.F.R.,  Ti-
tle 7, §§  1943.18;  1944.25).
FmHA  uses standardized  notes for its real
estate  loans containing  specialized conditions
and  terms to secure  the payment  of the loan
with interest,  protect the security,  and assure
that the  housing  and  other  property  will  be
maintained  in repair. The standardized  notes
contain  a "power of sale" provision whereby
borrowers agree that, if  borrowers fail to make
timely payments  and certain  conditions con-
cerning loan delinquency are met, FmHA can
accelerate  the loan so that  the entire  amount
of the unpaid principal  is due.  Failure to pay
the  entire  amount  of the  loan would  enable
FmHA to foreclose under state law. This pro-
vision  allows  FmHA  to  foreclose  through  a
nonjudicial  procedure  in  states  having  legal
authority for nonjudicial foreclosures.
Institutional  remedies  available  to  FmHA
against delinquent borrowers are voluntary and
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, 2 judicial
2 This includes liquidation  under the provisions of chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code, reorganization  under chapter  11,  or adjust-
ment of debts of an individual with regular income under chapter
13.  U.S. Code, Title  11,  §§  701,  1101,  and 1301  (1982). The  1986
Amendments  to the Bankruptcy  Code introduced a new  option,
"Chapter 12-Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Reg-
ular Annual Income."
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and  nonjudicial  foreclosures,  and  voluntary
conveyance  of secured  property  from  a bor-
rower  to FmHA  for satisfaction  of the  debt.
Because  involuntary  bankruptcy  proceedings
cannot be initiated against farmers, as defined
by  federal  bankruptcy  law,3 foreclosure  and
voluntary  conveyance  constitute  the  viable
remedies for the protection of FmHA's inter-
ests in mortgaged farm real estate. Involuntary
bankruptcy  may  be  employed  against  delin-
quent housing borrowers. In many cases, how-
ever,  foreclosure is the most appropriate rem-
edy for the preservation  of a lender's  interest
in mortgaged properties,  the removal  of bor-
rowers-debtors  from the property,  and the re-
coupment of a lender's investment through the
sale of the property to a third party. The rem-
edy of voluntary conveyance is also available,
but the  general  reluctance  of persons  volun-
tarily to convey their property to lenders limits
the usefulness of this remedy.
Approximately twenty states have two types
of foreclosure procedures: judicial foreclosure,
which involves  a time-consuming  court pro-
ceeding, and nonjudicial foreclosure, which in-
volves an abbreviated judical process in situ-
ations  where  the  borrower  has  previously
agreed to such a procedure. A nonjudicial fore-
closure avoids  court costs and property  hold-
ing costs  that typically  accompany  a judicial
foreclosure because it enables a lender to fore-
close  against  delinquent  borrowers  without
proving that the lender followed all applicable
rules and procedures  in accelerating  the loan.
The nonjudicial procedure thereby denies bor-
rowers a substantial procedural  advantage  in-
herent in the judicial foreclosure procedure that
is available in all fifty states.
The  legislative  parameters  concerning  the
qualifications  and amount  of funds  available
to  borrowers  and  the  administrative  provi-
sions delineating  the rights of FmHA and bor-
rowers  in  the  referenced  property  present
FmHA borrowers the economic choice of par-
ticipating in the FmHA loan programs within
a restricted opportunity set. As noted by Runge,
3  Federal  Bankruptcy  law  defines  a farmer  as  a  "person  that
received more than 80% of such person's gross income during  the
taxable year of such person immediately preceding the taxable year
of such  person during  which the case  under  this title concerning
such person was commenced from a farming operation owned or
operated by such person"  [U.S.  Code, Title  11,  § 101(17) (1982)].
"'Farming  operation'  includes  farming,  tillage  of the  soil, dairy
farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry,  or live-
stock, and production  of poultry or livestock products  in  an un-
manufactured state" [U.S.  Code,  Title  11, § 101(18) (1982)].
various property institutions contain different
vectors  of characteristic  rights that  delineate
the benefits being channeled to various agents.
FmHA  borrowers  who  desire  governmental
funds to facilitate the acquisition of real prop-
erty are required to  sign  a note that contains
a power of sale clause. Thus, borrowers' prop-
erty rights are conditioned upon FmHA's abil-
ity to use a legislatively sanctioned nonjudicial
foreclosure  procedure  if borrowers default  on
the note (Centner).
A Contractual "Hold-Up" Problem
Each FmHA loan involves  specific real prop-
erty. It thereby concerns a specialized or highly
firm-specific investment which means that both
the borrowers  and  FmHA  have  a  strong in-
centive to  see the contract through to conclu-
sion (Williamson).  Failure to complete  a con-
tract incurs transaction costs.  Repossession of
property  could entail  a loss  when  specialized
property  is  less  valuable  to  a  successor  pur-
chaser.  Borrowers who fail to make payments
and/or  fail to maintain  mortgaged  properties
adequately may preclude lenders from recoup-
ing the  outstanding  balance of a loan.  At the
same time, delinquent  borrowers may benefit
by their ability to continue to live in subsidized
housing at a cost below the market rate of sub-
stitute housing.
Borrowers with collateral that declines or is
declining  in value below the outstanding bal-
ance  of the  debt may maximize  their wealth
by delaying or precluding lenders from taking
action to repossess  the  collateral.  This  situa-
tion  has  recently  been  present  with  some
FmHA loans. Klein has labeled the transaction
costs present when a wealth maximizer is able
to  renege  on  a transaction  to  his or  her  ad-
vantage  as  a  "hold-up"  problem.  Accepting
contract  theory  advanced by Klein  and  Wil-
liamson,  the  "hold-up"  problem may justify
the  coercive  power-of-sale  term  of FmHA's
loans as a crucial element of a minimum-cost,
quality-policing  arrangement.
The  contractual  agreement  embodied  in
FmHA's standardized  note was incomplete as
it contained uncertainties concerning borrow-
ers'  ability  to  perform  and  level  of perfor-
mance.  Borrowers'  ability  to  repay  the bor-
rowed funds depended upon both endogenous
factors,  such  as  management  skills or gainful
employment of borrowers, and exogenous fac-
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tors,  such  as  the  natural  elements  (drought,
hail, freezes,  etc.), commodity prices, and real
estate values. These factors precluded  a com-
plete guarantee of performance of the contrac-
tual loan agreement.
Borrowers'  level  of performance  was  like-
wise  uncertain.  Since  the  legislation  indexes
loan repayments  to borrowers'  income,  bor-
rowers  have  a  diminished  incentive  to  find
more  lucrative  employment.  The  indexing
provision  constitutes  an  institutional  con-
straint which enables borrowers to hold up rents
being paid to FmHA in the form  of mortgage
repayments  through  underemployment.  An
additional  factor  that may influence  borrow-
ers' level of performance is the possibility that
Congress  may  grant  further  concessions,
through new or amended welfare legislation.
However,  even  more  significant  is the  fact
that borrowers rather than lenders control the
level of upkeep and maintenance  of the mort-
gaged properties. Given the nature of housing
and agricultural real estate, timely repairs and
acceptable  husbandry  practices  are  closely
linked to the future value of the property.  Sod-
busting on fragile soils and destruction of con-
servation  structures  such  as  terraces  are  ex-
amples of farming practices that may increase
short-term  economic  gains  at the  expense  of
longer-term  productivity  of soils,  and  hence,
market values of properties.  Failure to main-
tain houses,  farm  buildings,  and  other realty
also tends to diminish the future value of real
estate.
Since  many  FmHA  loans  advance  a large
percentage of the market value of the property
and the initial payments  on a loan are  com-
prised mainly of interest payments,  the value
of FmHA's collateral  at  the time the loan is
made may not be much greater than the amount
of the loan.  Any  deterioration  of FmHA-fi-
nanced real  estate  may cause  its value  to di-
minish so that it is less than the amount of the
outstanding debt.  Lower rates of appreciation
in the overall housing market and major down-
ward  adjustments  in  agricultural  real  estate
values in the 1980s relative  to earlier periods
have  accentuated  the  problem  of real  estate
values  falling  below  the  balance  of the  out-
standing debt.
Another  element  associated  with  transac-
tion costs of the "hold-up" problem is the fact
that the FmHA loan program provides credit
for applicants who could not otherwise obtain
credit  for such  a purpose,  with interest  rates
that are generally below market rates. The sub-
sidy on  interest rates  may be expected  to be
taken into account in investment decisions by
borrowers.  FmHA borrowers with subsidized
credit may make economic  decisions pertain-
ing  to  purchase  prices  of housing,  farm  real
estate, and farming operations that would not
be appropriate without subsidized credit. Con-
sidering the market power of initial sellers and
competition  among  potential  buyers,  subsi-
dized credit may become capitalized  into the
purchase  price  of the  property,  resulting  in
higher property prices. However, these higher
property  prices  may  not be  sustained if sub-
sequent buyers do not also receive an interest
subsidy. In some cases, the property  is resold
only on the basis that potential purchasers can
themselves  qualify for FmHA or similar gov-
ernment-financed  credit  programs.  Some-
times,  the capitalized  subsidy  would have to
be discounted for potential purchasers in order
for the property to be resold.
Taking into account the capitalized interest
subsidy  and  the  depressed  economic  condi-
tions in agriculture, the fact that many of these
FmHA-financed  properties  cannot  be  resold
readily at the purchase price creates problems
for innumerable  borrowers.  Because borrow-
ers  may be  unable  to get their equity  out of
such  properties,  their incentives  to invest  in
maintenance  and  repairs  and  use  conserva-
tion-oriented  husbandry practices  are  dimin-
ished. Furthermore, low incomes make it dif-
ficult for many borrowers to properly maintain
properties or to make timely repairs.
If FmHA borrowers fail to make timely in-
vestments in maintenance  and repairs  or use
appropriate husbandry  practices,  the  benefits
from  residing  in  the house  and/or  operating
the farm will decline. These  effects tend to ac-
cumulate  through  time.  Assuming  no  trans-
action costs  on the  part of the borrower  as-
sociated  with  default,  an  FmHA  borrower
rationally would default whenever the margin-
al benefits derived from continued ownership
of  the property fall below marginal costs. How-
ever,  defaulting  borrowers  incur  transaction
costs. These costs include the cost of relocation
and  increased  difficulty  in  obtaining  further
credit. The positive value of transaction costs
associated with default may cause FmHA bor-
rowers  to  continue  their  farming  operations
and/or remain in their residences until the sal-
vage  or market  value  of the property  is con-
siderably  below  the  outstanding  debt  on  the
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Table 2.  Characteristics of Foreclosures  and Voluntary Conveyances  under the FmHA Rural
Housing  Loan Program, 1984-85
Foreclosures  V
Voluntary
Judicial  Nonjudicial  Conveyances
Average  amount of debt ($)a  36,857  47,100  40,634
Average  property value  ($)  29,812  43,974  37,311
Average  direct loss to FmHA  ($)b  7,045  3,126  3,323
Length of time to complete  foreclosure  process  (mos.)  22.4  5.8
Average  number of property transfers  77  144  339
Note:  States reporting only judicial foreclosure procedures  were Florida, Georgia,  Hawaii,  Illinois, Louisiana,  Maine, Montana, Okla-
homa,  and Pennsylvania.  States  reporting  only  nonjudicial  foreclosure  procedures  were Alaska,  California,  Missouri,  and  Virginia.
Washington reported  the use of both judicial and nonjudicial  foreclosure procedures.
a Average amount  of debt on the property conveyed  to FmHA  includes principal and interest.
b Average  direct loss to FmHA is  average  property value minus average  debt outstanding.
loan. The difference between salvage or market
value  and  outstanding  debt  on  the property
can  be  considered  a  form  of "hold-up"  by
wealth-maximizing  borrowers.
Empirical Results
The  forty-six  FmHA  state  offices  were  sur-
veyed  to determine the magnitude  and  char-
acteristics  of foreclosures  and voluntary  con-
veyances  in  FmHA's  rural  housing  loan
program in the fiscal year 1984-85. This could
be considered a typical year for the rural hous-
ing loan program because  delinquencies  have
not escalated in this program as they have in
the farm loan program.4 One-third of the state
offices  responded with complete information.
A list of those states responding to the survey
and a summary of the  responses  are reported
in table  2.  On  the  1984-85  foreclosures  and
voluntary conveyances of rural houses, the av-
erage debt owed to FmHA was higher than the
average  property  values,  as measured  by the
price for which  FmHA resold the properties.
FmHA had a direct loss of $7,045  per house
on housing properties  under judicial  foreclo-
sures, compared  to $3,126  under nonjudicial
foreclosures.  With a t-statistic of 1.806,  these
means were  significantly  different  at the  10%
level  of significance.  Direct loss under volun-
tary conveyance was $3,323  per house.  There
4 The  percentages  of borrowers  delinquent  under FmHA's  In-
dividual Housing programs during  1978-85 were:  1978, 21%;  1979,
21%;  1980,  25%;  1981,  26%;  1982,  22%;  1983,  20%;  1984,  18%;
and  1985,  20%  (U.S. Department  of Agriculture,  Farmers  Home
Administration,  Brief  History of Farmers Home Administration,
Feb.  1986).
was statistical difference  (at the  5%  level) be-
tween  direct losses under judicial  foreclosure
and voluntary  conveyance, but no significant
difference between nonjudicial foreclosure and
voluntary conveyance.
This direct loss  does not take into  account
the indirect  loss  related  to  FmHA  expenses
incurred in the process.  Although no data are
available to measure these expenses, the length
of time needed for FmHA to divest delinquent
borrowers  of their  rights  in  real  estate  gives
some  indication of the relative  magnitude  of
the  indirect  expenses  under  judicial  versus
nonjudicial foreclosure procedures.  On the av-
erage, it takes 22.4 months between  initiation
and completion  of judicial foreclosures  com-
pared  to  5.8  months  for nonjudicial  foreclo-
sures.  These means were statistically different
at the  1%  level  of significance.
The average  number  of voluntary  convey-
ances per state was 339 during fiscal year 1984-
85. States with judicial foreclosure procedures
averaged  77  foreclosures,  while  states  with
nonjudicial foreclosures  averaged  144 foreclo-
sures. These means were  not statistically dif-
ferent.  States  using judicial  foreclosure  pro-
cedures  had  four  voluntary  conveyances  per
foreclosure, states with nonjudicial foreclosure
procedures had two voluntary conveyances per
foreclosure.  A possible  explanation  for  these
differences  is  that the threat  of judicial  fore-
closure procedures may have caused more bor-
rowers to convey their property voluntarily to
FmHA  rather  than  go  through  the  judicial
foreclosure  procedure.  Alternatively,  the non-
availability  of a nonjudicial  foreclosure  pro-
cedure  may  have  prompted  FmHA  to  use
greater efforts  to reach  accommodation  with
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delinquent  borrowers  for the  voluntary  con-
veyance  of mortgaged properties.
States  with  nonjudicial  foreclosure  proce-
dures  experienced  lower  average  losses  on
houses  that  were  voluntarily  conveyed  to
FmHA.  Direct losses to FmHA  on voluntary
conveyances  were  $2,400  per house  in those
states with nonjudicial foreclosure  procedures
and  $3,872 per house in those states with ju-
dicial  foreclosure  procedures.  Hence,  it  ap-
pears that  the  nonjudicial  foreclosure  proce-
dure  could be  used as  a technique  to  reduce
direct losses to FmHA on delinquent  loans.
The aggregate  magnitude  of the "hold-up"
problem in FmHA's rural  housing  loan pro-
gram can be  roughly approximated  from  the
data in  table  2.  Assuming  two-thirds  of the
states are employing judicial  foreclosure  pro-
cedures  and one-third nonjudicial foreclosure
procedures, the aggregate amount of direct loss
to FmHA on bad loans for rural housing was
estimated to be $75.4 million annually.5 This
figure does not take into account FmHA's ex-
penses  associated  with  these  bad  loans,  in-
cluding  expenses  related  to  foreclosures  and
reselling the properties.
Considering that the  average  market  value
of properties foreclosed on or voluntarily con-
veyed to FmHA is well below the level of debt
owed on the properties, these empirical results
clearly  support  the  concept  of  a  "hold-up"
problem  in FmHA's  rural housing  loan pro-
gram.  Many FmHA borrowers tend to main-
tain ownership of  properties while the property
value  is  deteriorating  to  levels  below  the
amount of debt owed to FmHA. Institutional
changes  can be used to reduce the magnitude
of the  "hold-up"  problem.  For example,  in-
stituting nonjudicial foreclosure procedures  in
those states presently using judicial foreclosure
procedures would have reduced the "hold-up"
cost by 56% on foreclosed loans in 1984-85.6
5 Aggregate direct loss to FmHA was calculated using figures in
table  2. With judicial foreclosures,  the direct loss was $7,045  per
house  times 77 property transfers per  state in  31  state  offices  for
a total of $16.8  million. With nonjudicial  foreclosures,  the direct
loss was  $3,126 per  house times  144  property transfers per state
times  15  state  offices  for a total of $6.8  million. With voluntary
conveyances, the direct loss was $3,323 per house times 339  prop-
erty transfers per  state  times 46  state  offices  for a total of $51.8
million. The overall total  was $75.4 million.
6 The direct loss  under  nonjudicial  foreclosures of $3,126  per
house was 56% lower than the direct loss under judicial foreclosure
of $7,045 per  house (table  2).
Conclusion
Uncertainties  inherent  in  the  FmHA  farm
ownership and  housing loan programs  create
transaction  costs.  Characteristics  of the  loan
programs  and borrowers  suggest  that the in-
dexed  loan repayments,  lack of maintenance
and  repairs,  failure  to  use  conservation-ori-
ented husbandry practices,  and capitalized in-
terest  subsidies  accompanying  declining  real
estate values create a "hold-up"  problem. The
value  of borrowers'  property may drop below
the outstanding  value  of the loan  so that the
collateral is insufficient to cover the debt. Data
from a survey of FmHA's rural housing pro-
gram documented losses by FmHA which were
greater when  a more  lengthy judicial foreclo-
sure  procedure  was  used  rather  than  nonju-
dicial foreclosure  or voluntary conveyance.
Transaction  costs  associated  with  FmHA
loans could be allocated to either borrowers or
the government.  Legislation could require bor-
rowers  to assume  responsibility  for  some  of
these costs by establishing more stringent bor-
rower entry  requirements,  shorter repayment
schedules,  or  a  property  inspection  program
with borrower fees.  On the other hand,  Con-
gress could have the government absorb these
costs.
An analysis of the applicable legislation and
regulations  indicates  that although  Congress
condoned  risky borrowers,  thereby obligating
the  government  to  assume  numerous  trans-
action costs, this did not include costs of fore-
going a judicial foreclosure procedure in those
states  containing  authority  for  such  a  proce-
dure.  The  legislatively  bestowed  vector  of
property  rights  allows  FmHA  to  include  a
power of sale provision in its loan agreements
to provide a remedy  for some of the transac-
tion costs that accompany its loans. Borrowers
who  fail to meet  repayment  obligations  may
be subject to nonjudicial foreclosure to enable
FmHA to extricate itself  quickly from bad loans
and  prevent  the further  diminution  of value
of mortgaged properties.
[Received August 1986; final revision
received January  1987.]
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